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NOTES

APPORTIONING THE RISK OF DELAY IN CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS: A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE
INADEQUATE "NO DAMAGES FOR DELAY" CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
Construction is a risky, competitive, and litigious business.' Each
new construction venture may bring together hundreds of parties-including owners, architects, engineers of all varieties, general
contractors, subcontractors and suppliers-many of whom have
never dealt with each other on previous projects. The design of most
projects is a new creation, often incomplete when construction
begins. Every construction site is unique. Labor conditions, weather,
material availability, and any number of other factors are difficult
to predict. Knowing little of what the future holds, the parties
nonetheless proceed to estimate how much the project will cost,
estimate how long it will take, contractually bind themselves
accordingly, and hope for the best.
Among the most obvious and common risks in the construction
industry is the risk of delay. As one court has noted, "except in the
middle of a battlefield, nowhere must men coordinate the movement
of other men and all materials in the midst of such chaos and with
such limited certainty of present facts and future occurrences as in

1. See BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS 16-6
(Aspen Law & Bus. 3d ed. 2000) (1987) ("Claims have become an institutionalized part of the
construction industry."); SMITH, CURRIE & HANCOCK LLP'S COMMON SENSE CONSTRUCTION
LAW 202 (Robert B. Ansley, Jr. et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001) ("Claims are a natural outgrowth of
a complex and highly competitive process during which the unexpected often happens.").

1857

1858

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1857

a huge construction project ...... Even the most successful projects-in the sense that all contracting parties walk away financially
satisfied-are rarely completed precisely according to the original
construction schedule. Despite the fact that delays are commonplace, the reality of a competitive bidding process requires that most
contractors carry little or no contingency for delay? Delays can have
devastating economic effects on both owners and contractors. In
fact, even when other problems occur on a project, the associated
delay is usually the most expensive consequence.4
Not surprisingly, parties have sought means of shifting the risk
of construction delay away from themselves. One mechanism used
towards this end is the common contractual provision known as a
"no damages for delay" clause. Imposed on general contractors by
owners or on subcontractors by general contractors, a no damages
for delay clause essentially states that the contractor will not be
entitled to monetary damages in the event of a delay. These clauses
are often used in connection with a statement that a time extension
is the sole remedy for the contractor's delay.5 Such a clause may be
worded as follows:
In the event that Subcontractor is obstructed or delayed in its
performance of its work by Contractor or Owner, Subcontractor
will be entitled to a reasonable extension of time. It is agreed
that the extension of time will be Subcontractor's sole and
exclusive remedy for such obstruction or delay, and that in no
event will the Subcontractor be entitled to recover damages from
Contractor or Owner for any such obstruction or delay.'
2. Blake Constr. Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
3. See ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., PROVING AND PRICING CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS 31

(Aspen Law & Bus. 3d ed. 2001) (1990) ("[11n order to be the successful bidder, the reality of
the marketplace requires that the contractor must compute its bid price assuming that all
aspects of the work can be completed in an orderly, unhindered way without delays or serious
disruptions ..... ).

4. See Kenneth M. Cushman & Joyce K. Hackenbrach, Construction Project Risk
Allocation: The Owner's Perspective,in HANDLING CONSTRUCTION RISKS: ALLOCATE Now OR
LITIGATE LATER 7, 15 (2002).
5. Kenneth M. Cushman & Bruce W. Ficken, Delays and Disruptions,in CONSTRUCTION
LITIGATION 639, 739-41 (Kenneth M. Cushman et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993); see also BRAMBLE &

CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-86 (noting that clauses in contracts that provide for time
extensions as the sole remedy for delays "are in effect no damages for delay clauses").
6. JAMES ACRET, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY FORMBOOK 245 (2d ed. 1990).
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No damages for delay clauses can vary widely in scope. At the
broadest end of the spectrum, some construction contracts use
language that damages are unavailable for delays resulting from
"any cause whatsoever."7 The example quoted above represents a
middle ground in which the clause covers delays caused by the
contractor or owner. An even narrower clause may apply only to
force majeure events.8
No damages for delay clauses in construction contracts have
always been very controversial. They often lead to inequitable
outcomes and harsh results for contractors delayed through no fault
of their own. On the other hand, there are numerous practical and
theoretical arguments in favor of their enforcement, not the least of
which is the foundational principle of freedom of contract.9 Because
these clauses are so exculpatory in nature, courts scrutinize them
carefully.1 ° Although no damages for delay clauses are not invalid
per se in most jurisdictions, close judicial attention has led to the
development of numerous well recognized exceptions to their
enforcement." One commentator has analogized the evolution of the
law in this area to a tennis match, in which no stable and suitable
end is in sight. 2
This Note argues that no damages for delay clauses are an
insufficient mechanism for apportioning delay risk in construction
contracts due to the convergence of two main factors. First, delay
damages can be amazingly complicated, expansive, and difficult to
calculate, even after a delay has occurred. Second, the enforceability of no damages for delay clauses is sporadic and varies by
jurisdiction. The result is an exponential uncertainty, which leaves
contracting parties helpless to put any kind of accurate value on
7. See, e.g., Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. Mass. Tpk. Auth., 196 N.E.2d 821, 827 (Mass. 1964).
8. See BRIAN M. SAMUELS, CONSTRUCTION LAW 116 (1996). "Force majeure" generally
refers to events or effects that cannot be anticipated or controlled, such as war or extreme
weather. Some construction contracts provide an express list of qualifying force majeure
events. Id.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See John E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 965, 966
(6th Cir. 1984) ("[B]ecause of their harsh effects, these clauses are to be strictly construed.");
Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 721, 723.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See JUSTIN SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION LAW 342 (1997).

1860

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1857

their exposure at the inception of a project, the time when key
economic decisions must be made.
Part I of this Note summarizes the current law regarding
enforceability of no damages for delay clauses and the judicial
exceptions that have developed. Part II examines some of the
practical and public policy considerations that have shaped the
jurisprudential landscape. Part III provides a brief overview of delay
claims and damages generally, the complexity of which must be
understood to gain more thorough insight into the ineffectiveness of
no damages for delay clauses. Part IV weighs all of the factors
introduced in the earlier Parts and concludes that the no damages
for delay clause is an undesirable solution to the challenge of
managing delay risk in construction contracts. Finally, Part V
examines potential alternatives to the no damages for delay clause
and suggests that a combination of provisions that limit the delay
damages recoverable by a contractor-rather than completely
denying any recovery-would be a more balanced solution.
I. ENFORCEABILITY OF No DAMAGES FOR DELAY CLAUSES AND THE
COMMON EXCEPTIONS

In most jurisdictions there is no per se rule concerning the
enforceability of no damages for delay clauses. 3 Most courts begin
with a presumption that these clauses are valid so long as they are
clearly drafted. 4 As noted above, however, courts will generally
construe no damages for delay clauses strictly, because they are
exculpatory in nature and because the consequences of enforcement
can be very severe. The result of this careful judicial scrutiny has
been the development of a considerable list of widely recognized
exceptions under which a no damages for delay clause will not be
enforced. Most courts and commentators cite four to six basic
exceptions, 5 but some of these are really generalizations that
encompass several different considerations. There is, however, a
common principle behind all of the exceptions-the fact that many
courts simply do not want to enforce a no damages for delay clause

13. See Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 721-24.
14. See id. at 722, 724.
15. See, e.g., BRAMBLE & CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-89 (citing six exceptions).
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when it is unreasonable or inequitable to do so. 16 Consequently, the
applicability of specific exceptions varies considerably from state to
state and even from court to court. This reality makes it difficult for
contracting parties working in multiple jurisdictions to gauge the
value of these clauses with any regularity.
A. Exception for Delays Not Contemplated by the Parties
Even if otherwise enforceable, a no damages for delay clause
often does not bar claims for delays not contemplated by the parties
at the time of contracting.'" The rationale for this exception is
simple. While the contractor may be responsible under the clause
for the risk of common and expected delays, some courts find it
inequitable also to hold the contractor responsible for delays that
were completely unexpected and outside the parties' original
contemplation. This exception has been applied to delays resulting
from a wide range of occurrences, including: a city's failure to obtain
a sewer right-of-way after assuring the contractor it would do so;"8
unexpected default of other contractors;' 9 and a state's submission
of misleading and inaccurate plans to the contractor.2 ° Conversely,
the delay was considered to have been contemplated by the parties
-and the no damages for delay clause enforced-in a case in which
the owner expressly advised the contractor of the possibility of
unmarked or improperly located utilities.2 ' In a somewhat more
surprising example, a no damages for delay clause was also enforced
when a wall adjacent to a construction site collapsed and killed two
16. See Richard Gary Thomas & Fred. D. Wilshusen, How to Beat a "No Damage for
Delay" Clause, 9 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 17, 22 (Jan. 1989) (pointing out that the exceptions are
often so intertwined that a practitioner may be able to overcome negative authority first by
convincing a court it would be unfair to enforce the no damages for delay clause in that case
and, second, by advancing any workable legal theory that would allow the court to disregard
the negative authority).
17. See, e.g., Corinno Civetta Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 493 N.E.2d 905,908 (N.Y.
1986).
18. See Franklin Contracting Co. v. State, 365 A.2d 952, 953, 956 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1976).
19. See People ex rel. Wells & Newton Co. of N.Y. v. Craig, 133 N.E. 419, 425-26 (N.Y.
1921).
20. See Cauldwell-Wingate Co. v. State, 12 N.E.2d 443, 446-47 (N.Y. 1938).
21. See DiGioia Bros. Excavating v. City of Cleveland Dep't of Pub. Util., 734 N.E.2d 438,
448-49 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
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workers and construction was delayed until the safety of other walls
could be certified.2 2
The difficulty with the "delay not contemplated by the parties"
exception is that the dispositive factor is the foreseeability of the
specific type of delay that occurs. Reasonable minds may of course
differ as to what delays are foreseeable. A strong argument could be
made that the players in the construction arena ought to expect the
unexpected. In fact, any long established entity would have to look
no further than its own project history to discover an amazing array
of delays stemming from all causes imaginable. Given this undeniable characteristic of the industry, it may not be reasonable for a
contractor to defend his claim for delay damages with the argument
that he thought this job would be different. In any event, courts
will sometimes look to other provisions in the contract in an attempt
to determine what specific types of delays were contemplated by
the parties. 2' For example, if a contract contains express language
dealing with site conditions, as many do, it is not likely that a court
will find delays resulting from adverse site conditions to be "not
contemplated by the parties" for the purpose of a no damages for
delay clause analysis.
The exception for delays not contemplated by the parties is
perhaps the broadest of the exceptions. This exception is so broad
because many courts find that where another exception applies-for
example, that the owner has "actively interfered" with the contractor's work-the delay was also not contemplated. Many opinions
that could be based exclusively on other exceptions, therefore, also
contain references to the lack of foreseeability of the delay.2 4
The exception for delays not contemplated is also the most varied
exception in terms of state-by-state application. Some states have
adopted the reasoning outlined above-that merely including a no
damages for delay clause provides evidence that the parties have
22. See Cunningham Bros. v. City of Waterloo, 117 N.W.2d 46,49-50 (Iowa 1962) (holding
that any delay by the owner in providing a prepared site to the contractor, regardless of how
unexpected the delay was, was one "contemplated by the parties" because the contract
provided for "any delay").
23. See BRAMBLE & CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-93 to 2-94.
24. See, e.g., Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 12 N.E.2d at 446-67 (holding that a delay caused by
the state's submission of misleading and inaccurate plans to the contractors was not
contemplated by the parties). These facts in Cauldwell-Wingate Co., however, could also fit
within the "active interference" exception. See infra Part I.B.
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contemplated all manner of delay.2" As a related matter, this
exception may also be the most vulnerable to differing clause
language. For example, in the case of a no damages for delay clause
that applies broadly to "any cause whatsoever,"" it may be difficult
to conclude that the parties did not contemplate a wide range of
unexpected delays. Where the clause is expressly limited to certain
types of delay, however, it is more likely that a court will find a
given event not to have been contemplated. This analysis for the
"delays not contemplated" exception is in contrast to most of the
other exceptions, which are based more on equitable and public
policy grounds than they are on an interpretation of the actual scope
of the clause.
B. Exception for Active Interference
Several states recognize an exception to the enforcement of no
damages for delay clauses in cases where the affirmative acts or
omissions of the enforcing party unreasonably interfered with the
contractor's performance.2 7 This exception is based not on a literal
interpretation of the clause, but on the equitable principle that an
owner or general contractor should not be allowed to exculpate
themselves from their own acts that lead to delays. Generally, most
courts do not consider ordinary negligence to constitute "active
interference" per se." In New York, for example, a party must make
a showing of gross negligence before a no damages for delay clause
will be invalidated.2 9 Similarly, a mere showing of poor project
administration by the owner is generally not sufficient."0 A growing
minority of jurisdictions, however, are expanding the "active
25. See ROBERT F. CUSHMAN & JAMES J. MYERS, CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK 931
(1999); JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 512-13 (Brooks/Cole Publ'g 6th ed. 2000) (1970).
26. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
27. See Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 728.
28. See, e.g., John E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 500 F. Supp.
910, 913 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("Mere negligence is not sufficient to avoid the consequences of the
,no damage for delay' clause."); Anthony P. Miller v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 165 F. Supp.
275, 283 (D. Del. 1958) (holding that negligent acts are not exempted).
29. E.g., Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 448 N.E.2d 413, 416-17 (N.Y. 1983)
(requiring gross negligence before a no damages for delay clause will be circumvented).
30. E.g., Martin Mech. Corp. v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 518 N.Y.S.2d 166, 168 (App. Div.
1987).
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interference" exception to cover acts that could be classified as
ordinary negligence, making judicial enforcement even more
uncertain.3
The "active interference" exception has been invoked, and
circumvention of a no damages for delay clause allowed, in cases in
which: the owner failed to keep a lake drained as required to allow
for the contractor's work;3 2 the owner severely mismanaged the
project by failing to deliver drawings on time or sign key
directives;33 and the owner denied site access by giving priority to
other contractors.' Many courts also hold that a breach of any
essential contract obligation by the owner may constitute active
interference." Some courts use similar reasoning to find that an
owner's failure to grant time extensions for excusable delays, if
required by contract, serves to waive a no damages for delay
clause.36
C. Exception for Fraud,Bad Faith,or Other Wrongful or Willful
Conduct
Even in states where the "active interference" exception is not
expressly recognized, few courts will allow an owner or general
contractor to escape liability for delays caused by "intentional[ly]
31. See Steven B. Lesser & Daniel L. Wallach, Risky Business: The "Active Interference"
Exception to No-Damage-for-DelayClauses, 23 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 26, 28-29 (Winter 2003)
(noting that this minority includes Florida and that New York may be heading in the
minority's direction).
32. See Coatesville Contractors & Eng'rs v. Borough of Ridley, 506 A.2d 862, 867-68 (Pa.
1986).
33. See Newberry Square Dev. Corp. v. S. Landmark, 578 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991).
34. See Phoenix Contractors v. Gen. Motors Corp., 355 N.W.2d 673,676-77 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984).
35. See Northeast Clackamas County Elec. Coop. v. Contl Cas. Co., 221 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.
1955) (citing cases); accordMarriott Corp. v. Dasta Constr. Co., 26 F.3d 1057, 1067-68 (11th
Cir. 1994) (noting that a refusal to grant a time extension after a proper request can
constitute sufficient fraud or active interference to overcome a no damages for delay clause);
Carlo Bianci & Co. v. State, 230 N.Y.S.2d 471,475-76 (1962) (holding that the no damages for
delay clause did not bar recovery, because the state breached its contractual obligation to use
due diligence to make the site available).
36. See Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay
Damages and JudicialEnforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 32, 35-36
(Fall 2002). See infra Part I.E. for a discussion of waiver.
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false or fraudulent statements or acts."3 7 This exception is particularly common in cases where the owner has misrepresented site
conditions and then refused to compensate the contractor for the
delay and extra work required to prepare the site.3" Other specific
instances in which an owner's bad faith has barred its reliance on
a no damages for delay clause include a case in which the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation knew but did not disclose to its
public contractor that the contractor would not have access to a
portion of the road for a fourteen-week period, 9 and a delay caused
when an owner gave its bridge superstructure contractor notice to
proceed while knowing that the substructure work was not complete.4 °
In addition to an exception for fraudulent statements, courts often
exempt delays caused by "other wrongful, willful, deliberate, or
arbitrary and capricious conduct from application of a no damages
for delay clause."4 ' For example, a federal court allowed recovery for
delay damages, despite the existence of a no damages for delay
clause, in a case in which the government knew a particular strike
was probable yet took no steps to attempt alternative procurement
of needed materials.4 2 The same result occurred in a case in which
the general contractor failed to provide contractually required
survey work for the subcontractor and intentionally misled the
subcontractor in bad faith.43
The distinction between the "active interference" exception and
the "willful misconduct" exception, where one exists at all, is merely
a matter of degree. In many jurisdictions that recognize the former,
it is discussed in terms that embrace the cases involving fraud and
bad faith discussed above." The distinction has significance, though,
37. Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 733.
38. See id. at 733-34.
39. See Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 343 A.2d 72,76-77 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975).
40. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 668 F.2d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 1982).
41. Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 735.
42. See Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 187, 191 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
43. See United States ex rel. Evergreen Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Merritt Meridian Constr.
Corp., 95 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1996).
44. See, e.g., Pellerin Constr. Inc. v. Witco Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 568, 583 (E.D. La. 2001)
('[Aictive interference' ... 'clearly implies that more than a simple mistake, error injudgment,
lack of total effort, or lack of complete diligence is needed ....'") (citing Peter Kiewit & Sons'
Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp 376, 397, 399 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (holding that active
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in states where courts do not expressly recognize an exception for
"active interference," but will nonetheless invalidate a no damages
for delay clause if the owner's conduct leading to the delay was truly
wrongful.45
D. Exception for UnreasonableDelays
A quantitative exception recognized in some cases is that a no
damages for delay clause does not apply to delays that are "unreasonable" in duration.46 Some courts rationalize the need for this
exception by finding a lengthy delay tantamount to abandonment of
contract,47 but the better reasoning is to categorize unreasonably
lengthy delays among those not contemplated by the parties.4 8 In
fact, while the theory that certain causes of delay were not contemplated may be problematic,4 9 the theory that unreasonably lengthy
delays were not contemplated, regardless of the cause, is more
realistic. The application of this exception requires courts to use
their discretion in determining what length of delay is "unreasonable." This discretion understandably leads to unpredictable results,
as there is no bright line rule.5' In general though, the claimant

interference requires "some affirmative, willful act, in bad faith, to unreasonably interfere
with plaintiffs compliance with the terms of the construction contract")).
45. See, e.g., ABA SuBcOMM. ON SURVEY OF STATE LAWS FOR THE CONSTR. INDUS., FIFTY
STATE MONOGRAPH ON THE ENFORCEABILITY OF "NoDAMAGES FOR DELAY CLAUSES" 152, 190
(1998) [hereinafter ABA FIFTY STATE MONOGRAPH] (listing Louisiana and Mississippi among
the states where an active interference exception has never been expressly articulated but
where exculpatory clauses generally are subject to invalidation if an owner commits fraud or
acts in bad faith).
46. See Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 736.
47. See Gatlin, supra note 36, at 34 (citing United States ex rel. Williams Elec. Co. v.
Metric Constructors, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 447, 450 (S.C. 1997) and Jensen Constr. Co. v. Dallas
County, 920 S.W.2d 761, 771 (Tex. App. 1996)).
48. See Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 736.
49. See supra Part I.A.
50. See, e.g., E.C. Nolan Co. v. State, 227 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)
(determining that a nine-and-a-half month delay on a project originally scheduled for twentyfour months was unreasonable); Am. Bridge Co. v. State, 283 N.Y.S. 577,584 (App. Div. 1935)
(stating that it was doubtful that the clause applied to a delay of twenty-one months). But see
Endres Plumbing Corp. v. State, 95 N.Y.S.2d 574, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (holding that a six-month
delay "was not so unreasonable as to constitute abandonment").
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must show that the delay was unknown, uncommon, or unreasonable in the context of the particulartype of work involved.5
E. Delays Not Covered by the Terms of the Clause and Waiver
Some no damages for delay clauses apply only to delays resulting
from certain enumerated5 2causes, without a catch-all phrase such as
"any cause whatsoever." In these cases the clause may be circumvented, not because it is invalid but because it does not cover the
specific delay that occurred. In that regard, this analysis does not
result in an actual exception to the enforcement of a no damages for
delay clause. It is worth consideration, however, because it provides
another discretionary means by which courts deal with challenges
to these clauses.
The reasoning that the clause does not cover certain types of
delays has been applied to allow recovery when a delay was caused
by a material supplier and the no damages for delay clause only
covered delays resulting from acts of the owner, architect, and
general contractor.5 3 It has also been applied to delays caused by
the prime contractor's steel supplier, when the clause only covered
those delays caused by "other contractors or subcontractors."5 4
Additionally, courts have found implied limitations on the scope of
a no damages for delay clause where it conflicts with other terms of
the contract.5 5

51. See Howard Contracting Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald Constr. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590,596
(Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a four-month delay by the owner in obtaining initial permits was
unreasonable); Dickinson Co. v. Iowa State Dep't of Transp., 300 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Iowa
1981).
52. See BRAMBLE & CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-86, 2-91.
53. See Giammetta Assocs. v. J.J. White, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 112, 113-14 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
54. United States Indus., Inc. v. Blake Constr. Co., 671 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
55. See, e.g., Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 67 F.3d 435, 438 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding that a clause that allowed for certain delay damages "notwithstanding any other
provision contained in th[e] agreement" overrode the absolute bar established by the no
damages for delay clause); Shintech Inc. v. Group Constructors, Inc., 688 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that a no damages for delay clause was not a complete bar to recovery
when the contract also included a provision creating liabilities for the owner for acts that
upset the contractor's schedule). But see PYCA Indus., Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water
Mgmt. Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 365-66 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a no damages for delay clause
was an additional requirement and did not conflict with EPA special conditions that were
incorporated in the contract by reference and were purported to allow delay damages).
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Waiver is an additional concept sometimes employed by courts to
avoid the harsh effects of enforcing a no damages for delay clause.
Like many contract terms, a no damages for delay clause can be
waived by actions of the parties inconsistent with the intent to
enforce the clause.56 For example, the owner's refusal to grant
appropriate time extensions for excusable delays has been said to
constitute a waiver of a no damages for delay clause in some cases.5"
F. Legislation
In addition to the considerable number of judicial exceptions to
enforcement of no damages for delay clauses, some states have also
enacted legislation regarding this issue.5 8 Although these statutes
vary in scope, a majority of them declare no damages for delay
clauses per se invalid in specific circumstances, such as public
works projects.59 Washington and Ohio have enacted fartherreaching statutes that invalidate no damages for delay clauses in all
contexts to the extent that they seek to exculpate an owner from
liability for delays occasioned by its own acts.6 °
56. See, e.g., Chi. Coll. of Osteopathic Med. v. George A. Fuller Co., 776 F.2d 198, 202-03
(7th Cir. 1985) (stating that a no damages for delay clause was waived by the owner through
repeated oral promises that they would reimburse the contractor for damages occasioned by
delay notwithstanding the clause); Findlen v. Wichendon Hous. Auth., 553 N.E.2d 554,555-56
(Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the owner waived a no damages for delay clause by virtue
of earlier payments for delay damages made in contravention of the provision).
57. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
58. For a general discussion of the various legislative responses to no damages for delay
clauses, see Susan Sisskind Dunne, Legislative Update: "No Damage for Delay" Clauses, 19
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 38, 39-40, 47 (Apr. 1999).
59. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-2617 (2004) (requiring public contracts to allow for
negotiation of certain delay damage claims and therefore prohibiting blanket no damages for
delay clauses); CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (West 2004) (stating that provisions in public
contracts that provide for time extension as the sole remedy for delay shall not be construed
to prevent recovery of damages in cases in which a delay was unreasonable and not within the
contemplation of the parties); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-91-103.5 (2002) (voiding, as against
public policy, any no damages for delay clause in a public contract that purports to limit a
contractor's recovery of damages for delays caused by the public entity contracting the work);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 34.058 (2001) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-134.3 (2003) ("No contractual
language [in a public construction contract] forbidding or limiting compensable damages for
delays caused solely by the owner or its agent may be enforced ....").
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62(c)(1) (West 2001) ("Any provision of a construction
contract ... that waives or precludes liability for delay ... when the cause of the delay is a
proximate result of the owner's act or failure to act ... is void and unenforceable as against
public policy."). Washington has a similar statute that states:
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G. Other Factors Creating Uncertainty
The exceptions and rules of enforceability highlighted above are
broad generalizations. In practice, the question of whether a no
damages for delay clause is enforceable is very fact- and
jurisdiction-specific. A complete state-by-state survey of the law
regarding these clauses is beyond the scope of this Note but has
been done effectively by other practitioners and commentators.6 ' In
reality, any attempt to generalize or codify the law regarding no
damages for delay clauses may be a hollow academic pursuit. Courts
frequently intertwine the various rationales and base their decisions
largely on discretionary and equitable grounds.6 2 As one pair of
commentators has noted, "it appears that these exceptions function
as legal fictions to allow the judicial sense of fairness to mitigate a
perceived harsh result."'
There are also several factual circumstances that sometimes
make the enforcement of a no damages for delay clause more or less
likely. Some courts are more inclined to enforce the clause when it
is combined with language guaranteeing time extensions as a
remedy for excusable delays." Another example is that no damages
for delay clauses may provide more protection for public owners
than private." Judicial tendencies on these points are hardly
consistent, however, and the presence or absence of such factors in
Any clause in a construction contract ... which purports to waive, release, or
extinguish the rights of a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to damages or
an equitable adjustment arising out of unreasonable delay in performance which
delay is caused by the acts or omissions of the contractee or persons acting for
the contractee is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.360 (1988).
61. See ABA FIFTY STATE MONOGRAPH, supra note 45 (presenting a survey of all fifty
states and the District of Columbia in which individual authors addressed eleven
predetermined issues regarding the validity of no damages for delay clauses in their states);
CUSHMAN & MYERS, supra note 25, at ch. 26 (discussing a survey of case law from twentyeight states from 1979 to 1999).
62. See Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 721 ("[Flew if any generalizations about nodamage-for-delay cases are entirely reliable .... The courts, attempting to do justice in
individual cases, have applied varying rationales.").
63. BRAMBLE & CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-89.
64. This inclination may be based on the fact that the time extension clause is viewed as
consideration for the no damages for delay clause. See Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at
739.

65. See BRAMBLE & CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-88.
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a particular case does little to increase the certainty with which the
enforceability of the clause can be predicted.
The question of whether any given no damages for delay clause
is judicially enforceable is ultimately a very difficult one. In a few
states, the highest court has issued an opinion outlining the exact
exceptions applicable in that state to provide guidance for uncertain
lower courts.66 In most states, however, confusion continues to be
the rule and certainty the exception. The next Part considers the
conflicting policy arguments that have prevented courts from
reaching a consensus in this area.

II. CONFLICTING POLICY ARGUMENTS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE
UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE

That the law regarding the validity of no damages for delay
clauses has developed into such an uncertain form is indicative of
the fact that there are strong arguments on both sides as to whether
no damages for delay clauses should be used and enforced. There
are many arguments, grounded in both pragmatic and policy
concerns, that weigh in favor of the use and enforcement of these
clauses. There are also persuasive arguments weighing against
enforcement. It is no surprise that the judicial reception of no
damages for delay clauses has become so uncertain, and the host of
exceptions now in place show that courts have strived to compromise between the two positions. This Part outlines some of the
arguments on each side.
A. Arguments for the Enforcement of No Damagesfor Delay
Clauses
The most obvious, and perhaps strongest, argument for enforcement of no damages for delay clauses is the concept, long idealized
in American jurisprudence, of freedom of contract.6 7 One aspect of
66. See JAMES ACRET, CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK 7-22 to 7-23 (2d ed. 2003)
(discussing Corinno Civetta Constr. Corp. v. New York, 493 N.E.2d 905, 909-10 (N.Y. 1986)
and United States ex rel. Williams Elec. Co. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 447, 448
(S.C. 1997)).
67. SWEET, supra note 12, at 340 (arguing that no damages for delay clauses cannot be
categorized as unfair, because the contractor "made a contract, perhaps at a higher bid price,
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this principle is that both parties sign the contract knowing the
potentially severe consequences that the clause may have. In fact,
the very inclusion of a no damages for delay clause in the contract
may carry considerable weight in the determination of contract
price. Consequently, the contracting process is an area in which
courts should not be quick to interfere. An owner or general
contractor should be entitled to pass the risk of delay and exercise
economic control over the project if he desires and the other
contracting party is willing. Similarly, there is a belief that owners
have a right to know the total cost of a project at its inception. This
is especially true for public projects, when tax money and complex
bond and appropriations issues are likely involved.68
As a practical matter, no damages for delay clauses are said to
help prevent contractors from asserting vexatious claims.6 9 It is an
unfortunate but undeniable fact that many contractors in the
modem construction industry begin projects knowing that much, if
not all, of any profit they make will be made through the claims
process. When each contractor on a large project is allowed to claim
damages every time they are minimally delayed by another party,
the effect on the economics and administration of the project can be
devastating.
It follows that no damages for delay clauses also provide a
strong incentive for contractors to prevent delay.70 A contractor who
is able to sit back and collect delay damages at the end of a project
is likely to do just that. Conversely, a contractor who knows he holds
the monetary risk of any delay is much more likely to take a
proactive role in preventing delay. As a result, no damages for delay
clauses can be an invaluable tool in encouraging cooperation and
coordination among contractors.
An additional practical argument in favor of using no damages for
delay clauses is that they force contractors to include contingency
for the risk of delay in their estimates, and bid accordingly. In
theory, this process prevents the unfair situation in which delay
damages are allowed and one bidder decreases its bid up front,
knowing a particular risk would be his").
68. See ROBERT A. RUBIN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS: PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION

84 (3d ed. 1999); SWEET, supra note 25, at 511-12.
69. See Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 722.
70. See BRAMBLE & CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-87.
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planning to recover for delays later. 7' A final argument is that other
contractual mechanisms sufficiently allow for recovery of extra
costs, because delays often occur in association with other compensable events, such as changes in the work. 72 These mechanisms may
include differing site conditions clauses and change order markup.7 3
B. Arguments Against the Enforcement of No Damagesfor Delay
Clauses
The freedom of contract argument in favor of enforcing no
damages for delay clauses may be overly idealistic. In reality,
owners occupy a much stronger bargaining position than the
contractors who work for them. In many cases the bidding contractors have no choice but to accept no damages for delay clauses and
other owner-friendly contract provisions if they wish to participate
in the work.
It also may be naive to say that contractors weigh the risk of
delay and simply add sufficient contingency to their initial estimates. Most contractors cannot accurately price the risk of owner
interference or other unpredictable delays, especially on a new
project, under new circumstances, and perhaps with an owner with
whom they have not dealt before.74 Perhaps even more important is
that, in reality, bidders must often forego adding any contingency if
they want to win a bid. 75 Essentially, "the contract becomes a
gambling proposition," where one side often receives a windfall.7 6
Rarely will the contingency amount exactly equal the eventual costs
of delay. Either the contractor includes too much money and
receives a windfall, or more commonly, the contractor does not
include enough and the owner receives a tremendous bargain.

71. See RUBIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 84-85.
72. See id. at 86.
73. When the scope of a contractor's work on a project is changed through design
modification or owner request, the contractor is generally allowed a certain markup on the
cost of the additional work. Although this markup is typically designated as "overhead and
profit," some in the industry argue that it also accounts for minor delay and inefficiency costs
occasioned by the change.
74. See SWEET, supranote 12, at 341.
75. See SWEET, supranote 25, at 512.
76. Gatlin, supra note 36, at 32.
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In a larger public policy context, some argue that it is unconscionable for owners and general contractors to exculpate themselves
ahead of time for the costs of delays they cause subcontractors."
This view has been influential in the few states that have passed
legislation invalidating no damages for delay clauses in certain
circumstances.78
The potential inequities of these clauses manifest themselves
even more clearly in situations where the contract also includes a
clause allowing the owner to recover liquidated damages for delay.
It is conceivable that a contractor delayed by the owner or some
other cause beyond its control could, first, not recover its own
damages due to a no damages for delay clause and, second, have to
pay liquidated damages to the owner.79 Commentators have also
argued that no damages for delay clauses foster an adversarial
relationship among contracting parties, ° creating a disincentive for
owners to resolve project issues expeditiously.8 '
Another potential impact is that bids on a project may be higher
than necessary as contractors put a premium on the risk that there
might be delays for which they will not be compensated. 2 This
precaution arguably adds unnecessary overall cost to the project. Of
all the arguments against enforcement, however, this is among the
least persuasive, because no damages for delay clauses frequently
result in a decrease in total project cost, as contractors fail to include
enough contingency to cover the actual costs of delay.
Far from resolving the debate over no damages for delay clauses,
the arguments on both sides of the issue demonstrate why courts
have been so hesitant to establish a firm rule one way or the other.
Further, this analysis of the competing arguments shows that a no
damages for delay clause is not an appropriate mechanism for
apportioning delay risk in construction projects.

77. See BRAMBLE & CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-87; RUBIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 8586; J. Bert Grandoff, The "No Damagefor Delay" Clause: A Public Policy Issue, 75 FLA. B.J.
8, 8-11 (2001).
78. See supra Part I.F.
79. See BRAMBLE & CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-87.
80. See RUBIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 85.
81. See id; SWEET, supra note 25, at 512.
82. BRAMBLE & CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 2-87; RUBIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 85.
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III. THE COMPLEXITIES OF CONSTRUCTION DELAY
A. Why Delay Risk Is Different from Other Types of Risks
The preceding discussion of the public policy considerations
implicated by the use of no damages for delay clauses and their
enforceability calls for an analysis of why delay damages are so
special. Construction entities use the contracting process to achieve
all manner of risk allocation. The fact that a contract clause
purports to place all of a certain type of risk on one party is not so
unusual, yet courts have become very skeptical when delay risk is
treated in this manner. The reason for this different treatment of
delay risk, and the reason why no damages for delay clauses are an
inadequate mechanism, is better understood in light of two important attributes of construction delay risk. First, delay is the most
prevalent and most costly risk in the industry. Second, delay
causation and damages are often complicated and difficult to prove,
even without considering the uncertainty of a no damages for delay
clause. What follows is a brief overview of construction delay claims
and damages, which is necessary to understand the complete
context in which no damages for delay clauses operate.
Simply put, "[dielays are a way of life in the construction industry."8 3 The inevitability of delay immediately raises concerns over
whether a "stick your head in the sand" approach taken through the
use of a no damages for delay clause is adequate. It is one thing to
completely allocate the risk of minor eventualities for administrative ease, but to do this so casually in the case of all delay risk on a
project may be unreasonable.
As a general matter, all delays can be categorized as excusable or
non-excusable, depending on whether the contractor is entitled to a
time extension, and as compensable or non-compensable, depending
on whether the contractor is entitled to damages for the delay.' 4 The
parties to a contract may, of course, define these categories any way
they choose. No damages for delay clauses purport to make all
delays non-compensable, regardless of whether they are excusable.

83. RuBIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 81.
84. See CusHMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 33-36; id. at 86-88.
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B. Causes of Delay and Components of Delay Damages
The virtually infinite list of potential causes of construction delay
is one factor that explains both the inevitability and the complexity
of proving delay claims." Causes that might be compensable,
assuming the absence of a no damages for delay clause, include:
differing site conditions from what was disclosed by the owner,
defective drawings or specifications, the owner's failure to provide
access, improper site preparation, failure to provide owner-supplied
materials, the architect's failure to approve shop drawings, the
owner's or general contractor's failure to coordinate other contractors, failure to make timely payments, failure to inspect, excessive
change orders, or failure to accept completed work. 6 Delays that are
commonly excusable, though not compensable, may include those
caused by bad weather and other acts of nature or certain labor
problems, such as a completely unanticipated strike. Not surprisingly, delays resulting from causes that are under the contractor's
own control are generally non-excusable and non-compensable.
Common examples of such delays include a contractor's failure to
provide sufficient manpower or sufficient material quantities."
A simple recitation of the potential monetary components of delay
damages serves to demonstrate how expansive the impact of a
significant delay can be. Direct delay damages may include field and
home office overhead, idle equipment or labor costs, inefficiencies or
loss of productivity, equipment and material storage costs, additional mobilization or demobilization, extended insurance and
bonding costs, and escalation costs due to increases in material and
labor costs during the period of delay. 8 In addition to the long list
of potential direct costs, there are also several categories of consequential damages. These damages can include loss of profits on
85. See SWEET, supra note 12, at 318 ("The many possible causes of delay can make delay
claims complicated and difficult to sustain.").
86. For further discussion of these and other potential causes of construction delay, see
SMITH, CURRIE & HANCOCK LLP, supra note 1, at 166-70; SWEET, supra note 12, at 317-18.
87. See SWEET, supra note 12, at 317.
88. For further discussion of these and other components of delay damages, see CUSHMAN
ET AL., supra note 3, at 57-62; RUBIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 119-28; SMITH, CURRIE &
HANCOCKLLP, supra note 1, at 174-75; Cushman & Ficken, supra note 5, at 690-720; Ian A.L.
Strogatz et al., Pricingthe Delay: Whom Do I Sue and What Do I Get?, 17 CONSTRUCTION LAW.
4, 8-10 (Oct. 1997).

1876

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1857

current or future projects, loss of bonding capacity, prejudgment
interest and financing costs, and occasionally even legal fees.
C. Difficulties in Calculatingand Proving Delay Claims
There are additional factors, beyond the lengthy lists of potential
causes and damage components, that make the proof and calculation of delay claims very uncertain. One notable factor that plays a
significant, role in the proof of causation is the notion of concurrent
delay. When a contractor is delayed, there may be a variety of
causes that all played a part, some compensable and others not. As
noted by one commentator, "delays by their very nature are ongoing,
intertwined, intermittent, and very difficult to segregate between
those caused by the defendant and those caused by the plaintiff."9
The early judicial position on concurrent delays was that no
recovery was allowed, but modern courts often try to apportion the
delay damages if the claimant can show a clear division of the costs
attributable to each party.9"
Proof of delay causation may also be complicated by questions
regarding the duties of a contractor to mitigate delay damages.
Owners often assert that a contractor could have mitigated damages
by taking steps such as reallocating idle resources to other projects.
In practice, these alternatives are rarely as simple as defendants
suggest. 91 A contractor's orchestration of manpower and equipment
across many projects is often a complicated matter, and rarely can
idle resources be simply shifted to another site at no cost when a
project is delayed.
Even in cases in which delay causation can be established
sufficiently, calculation and proof of damages is very complicated.92
89. Strogatz et al., supra note 88, at 13.
90. See CUSHMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 36-39; SMITH, CURRIE & HANCOCK LLP, supra
note 1, at 171-72.
91. Michael K Love, TheoreticalDelay and OverheadDamages, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 33,48
(2000) (presenting six broad considerations that affect any decision for potential mitigation
plans).
92. See CUSHMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 51-54 (presenting a detailed ten-step "time
impact analysis procedure," most of which requires a scheduling expert); SMITH, CURRIE &
HANCOCK LLP, supra note 1, at 176 (outlining eighteen potential sources of project data that
are crucial in preparing a delay claim); SWEET, supra note 12, at 411-15 (discussing the crude
formulas that have developed as proxies when calculation of actual damages is not possible);
Love, supra note 91, at 51 (arguing the insufficiency of the widely used Eichleay formula that
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Identifying and quantifying the precise costs that resulted from a
particular delay is not an easy task, and the process usually
involves significant use of experts. Even the contractor who wades
successfully through the numbers will have to overcome tough
evidentiary issues before he can present the results at trial.9 3
The proof and calculation of delay damages is further complicated
by the fact that all these efforts are dependent on the regularity and
accuracy of the records kept by the project management staff during
construction. It is easy to assert from the sidelines that proper
documentation of project events should be simple, but a "construction project by its very nature is dynamic."94 The focus of the project
team during construction is often drawn away from record keeping,
as it struggles to deal with arising issues and keep the project
moving forward. In the end though, the certainty with which even
the best experts and attorneys can prepare a delay claim is heavily
dependent on the quality of documentation kept during the project.
IV. No DAMAGES FOR DELAY CLAUSES ARE NOT THE ANSWER
Given the considerable economic impact that delays may have on
a construction project, it is not surprising that parties seek to
apportion the risk of delay. The no damages for delay clause is one
popular mechanism employed for that purpose. Unfortunately, no
damages for delay clauses "do not provide reliable security to
owners seeking some degree of certainty as to their potential
liability for delay."9 5
First, the risk of delay is an enormous issue in construction, and
the proof and calculation of delay damages can be extraordinarily
challenging, even after a delay has occurred.96 Because delay claims
can potentially have huge economic impacts on owners and contractors alike, a blanket ban on recovery under a no damages for delay
clause is an enormous and almost unquantifiable risk. Valuation of
this risk at the beginning of a project is extremely difficult. There
serves as an approximation of home office overhead costs resulting from construction delays).
93. See Strogatz et al., supra note 88, at 12-14 (discussing the use of summaries, the use
of expert testimony, and hearsay complications).
94. CUSHMAN ETAL., supra note 3, at 49.
95. Gatlin, supra note 36, at 36.
96. See supra Part III.
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are simply too many variables. Even if there were some method of
valuation that was even remotely reliable, it is unclear what impact
that would have on actual contracting practices. In most cases, even
the contractor armed with what he believed to be an accurate
valuation of the delay risk on a particular project would face
pressure to reduce or eliminate any contingency from his bid in
order to win the contract.
Second, the no damages for delay clause comes with a host of its
own questions and uncertainties regarding enforceability. 7 Because
these clauses have been subject to so much criticism and judicial
scrutiny, parties are forced to weigh not only the uncertainty of the
delay risk on a project generally, but also the risk that the clause
may not be enforced. Owners began using no damages for delay
clauses out of concern that their potential liabilities to contractors
for delay was so uncertain. The fix was to simply force the contractor to accept all risk of delay. Unfortunately, while the clause may
bring peace of mind at the beginning of a project, it ultimately
makes owners' liabilities for delay dependent on a judicial coin toss.
Considering that the purpose of a no damages for delay clause is to
provide increasedcertainty as to each party's liability for delay, the
clause fails more often than not.
Due to the complexity of trying to put a value on such an
enormous risk in an uncertain legal setting, inequitable outcomes
are inevitable.9 8 According to the summation of one commentator,
"[tihe uncertainty of their application, their exculpatory effect, and
the difficulty of pricing the risk make [no damages for delay clauses]
inappropriate."9 9 The following Part discusses several alternative
mechanisms for the apportionment of delay risk in construction
contracts to alleviate these concerns.

97. See supra Parts I-I.
98. Gatlin, supra note 36, at 32 (describing how no damages for delay clauses usually
result in a windfall for one side).
99. SWEET, supra note 12, at 342.
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V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE No DAMAGES FOR DELAY CLAUSE

A. LiquidatedDelay Damages
Liquidated damages are commonly used in regard to the owner's
delay damages, suffered when the contractor fails to deliver the
project on time, but occasionally construction contracts also include
liquidated damage clauses regarding the contractor'sdelay damages.' 00 Liquidated damages are generally expressed in terms of a
daily rate.
The standard rules of enforceability for liquidated damages
provisions apply in the construction industry. The amount must be
a reasonable estimation of expected actual damages at the time the
contract is signed,'0 ' and actual damages must be difficult to
prove.0 2 If these two requirements are not met, the clause is
unenforceable as a penalty. 1' 3 Some courts also consider whether the
clause was the result of actual bargaining or whether it was
imposed on a party of inferior bargaining strength.' °4
Liquidated damages have several advantages, including ease of
calculation and simplification of litigation. They relieve contractors
5
of the uncertainty and expense of proving actual damages.' They
also simplify project administration, as detailed record keeping is
necessary only for the time and causation elements of delay, not the
cost issues. Liquidated damages give owners a firm basis for
6
predicting the scope of their potential liabilities up front." The fact
that contractor delay damages are even more difficult to calculate
than owner damages might create an additional judicial incentive
100. See CUSHMAN & MYERS, supra note 25, at 1179-80. For a discussion of the use and

benefits of liquidated damages provisions in the more typical context of owners' delay
damages, see R. Harper Heckman & Benjamin R. Edwards, Time is Money: Recovery of
LiquidatedDamages by the Owner, 24 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 28 (Fall 2004).
101. See CUSHMAN & MYERS, supra note 25, at 1172-75.
102. See id. at 1175-78.
103. See SWEET, supra note 25, at 504-05 (presenting Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago, 350
F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1965), as representative of the modem judicial attitude); see also Heckman
& Edwards, supra note 100, at 29-30.
104. See ACRET, supra note 66, at 7-33; SWEET, supra note 25, at 506.
105. See ACRET, supra note 66, at 7-32.
106. See Gatlin, supra note 36, at 36; see also Heckman & Edwards, supra note 100, at 29
(listing among the benefits, "the creation of firm expectations for all parties involved about
what damages for delay will be").
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to enforce liquidated damage clauses in that setting. 0 7 Finally, most
parties involved in construction are familiar and comfortable with
the use of liquidated damages.' °8
Unfortunately, there are also many disadvantages to liquidating
a contractor's delay damages. First, widespread use of this mechanism may not be practical, because owners usually have superior
bargaining power and rarely want to give contractors what some
may view as an easier way to collect damages. 09 Liquidating a
contractor's delay damages may also create a disincentive for
contractors to avoid delays if they have a favorable liquidated
damages rate. Additionally, this approach may not be as simple in
administration as it initially appears. Even with a liquidated
damages clause in place, a claimant will still need to have experts
examine complicated causation issues, such as interferences and
concurrent delays, to determine how many days of liquidated
damages should be awarded."0 It may also be argued that liquidated damages clauses are not all that much better than no
damages for delay clauses in terms of judicial certainty."'
B. Liquidated Delay Damages with a Cap
Another alternative is to use a modified liquidated damages
clause that includes some sort of cap, either at a specific dollar
amount or a specified percentage of the contract price." 2 Most of the
general points regarding liquidated damages still apply, but this
alternative carries additional advantages and disadvantages. On the
favorable side, a liquidated damages clause with a cap eases some
of the difficulties of apportioning causation in the event of a lengthy
delay. If the cap is exceeded, it becomes less important to fight over
107. See SWEET, supra note 25, at 514.
108. See CUSHMAN & MYERS, supra note 25, at 1171 ("[Tjhe use of liquidated damages
provisions is just an outgrowth of the prevailing culture in construction to agree formally in
advance about contingencies that might arise during the construction project.").
109. See id. at 1180.
110. See id.
111. See ACRET, supra note 66, at 7-32 ("Decisions can be found that support almost every
imaginable shade of opinion as to the propriety, practicality, utility, and enforceability of
liquidated damages clauses.").
112. See Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268, 1274 (2d Cir.
1971) (involving an electrical equipment contract with a clause allowing liquidated damages
not in excess of five percent of the original equipment price); SWEET, supra note 25, at 509.
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the exact division of liability for concurrent delays, because no
further recovery is attainable. This type of mechanism also benefits
owners who want to know their maximum exposure to liability at
the beginning of the project and avoid open-ended liability." 3
On the other hand, a contractor still faces considerable risks from
larger delays under a capped liquidated damages clause. Incentives
may also still be a problem, as the contractor would have little
motivation to avoid delays until the cap is reached. A cap on delay
damages could also be used in the absence of a liquidated damages
clause." 4 Most of the same arguments would apply, regardless of
whether the recoverable damages were actual or liquidated.
C. EliminationPeriod
Some commentators have suggested an alternative that is, in
some ways, the opposite of a liquidated damages clause with a cap.
Instead of an upper limit on recovery, the contract can fix a lower
limit-not with respect to the dollar amount of the damages, but
with respect to the duration of delay."5 This "elimination period," as
it has been described, would serve as a deductible-recovery would
not begin until the cumulative impact of all delays reaches a certain
number of days. These clauses have also been referred to as
"corridor provisions. " "'
The advantages of such a provision are clear. First, it reduces
some of the harshness of an absolute no damages for delay rule, as
the contractor is protected in the event of truly significant delays.
This protection leads to the practical advantage that bids need only
include contingency for minor and typical delays, for which valuation is much easier." 7 The use of an elimination period also
produces a good balance of incentives. Owners are encouraged to
administer the project efficiently to avoid surpassing the elimination period, while contractors still have incentive to avoid delays
knowing that they hold the risk until the delays become lengthy.
113. See SWEET, supra note 12, at 342.
114. See id.
115. See JAMES E. STEPHENSON, ALTERNATIVE CLAUSES TO STANDARD CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS 296 (1990); SWEET, supra note 12, at 342.
116. See Gatlin, supra note 36, at 36.
117. See id.
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This mechanism, like all the alternatives, cannot satisfy all of the
concerns of both parties. Owners would still be subject to openended liability once the elimination period is surpassed. Also, the
contractor's incentive to avoid further delay disappears once the
elimination period has run and all damages become recoverable.
Additionally, some may argue that this system still does not address
equitable concerns, because contractors would still be forced to
swallow delay damages for the shorter delays that were out of their
control. This argument is considerably weaker, however, under an
elimination period clause than it is under a no damages for delay
clause, because by removing the contractor's exposure to the risk of
longer delays, it becomes much more likely that an adequate
contingency will be carried and no inequitable harm will be suffered.
It is important to note that this-or any of the alternatives-can
be modified to cover only certain causes of delay,"' or can be
combined with the other alternatives. As will be argued below, it
may be that the best solution employs a combination of approaches.
D. Limit Recovery to Specified Direct Costs
The alternatives suggested to this point have all been directed at
the temporal or causal aspects of delay. An equally plausible
solution may be to allow all provable delay claims but to limit
recovery to certain direct costs, as expressly identified in an exhibit
9
to the contract, and not to allow consequential damages." Like
some of the other alternatives, this mechanism would serve to
reduce the harshness of an absolute no damages for delay clause,
which would in turn likely yield increased enforceability as
compared to a no damages for delay clause. Owners would know
that they can avoid potentially astronomical consequential damage
awards. 20 A system by which only direct costs were recoverable
would also provide a good balance of continual incentives on both
sides. Owners would have the incentive to administer the project
118. This is actually the case in the clause suggested by James Stephenson, which only
includes direct costs for excusable delays, not those that are owner-caused. See STEPHENSON,
supra note 115, at 296.
119. See Kenneth M. Cushman & Joyce K. Hackenbrach, Delays and Disruptions, PLI
Advanced Construction Claims Workshop 24-25 (Oct. 1990).
120. See STEPHENSON, supranote 115, at 297.
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effectively to avoid the direct cost liability, whereas contractors
would have an incentive to avoid the lengthy delays that would lead
to the accrual of unrecoverable consequential costs. Of course, under
such a clause the contractor still bears a certain risk that lengthy
delays might occur and consequential damages might result, but
this outcome is considerably less harsh than that which results
under a traditional no damages for delay clause.
E. A ProposedProvisionThat Couples an EliminationPeriodwith
a Limitation on the Types of DamagesRecoverable
The goal in determining the best mechanism for apportioning
delay risk in construction contracts must be to achieve the greatest
balance of certainty, practicality, and incentives. No damages for
delay clauses have proven to be deficient in all three categories.' 2 '
Because of the enormous impact that construction delays can
have, it is essential that any alternative to the no damages for delay
clause provides an increased level of certainty and judicial predictability. It is no surprise that owners, given the choice, will seek to
shift as much risk as possible down to their contractors. The no
damages for delay clause is such a severe risk-shifting mechanism,
however, that judicial enforcement is largely unpredictable.' 2 2 An
alternative that apportions the risk in a more balanced fashion
would likely produce increased certainty and reliability for owners,
while still allowing parties to evaluate their potential liabilities at
the beginning of the project.
Any suitable alternative to the no damages for delay clause must
also be practical. A mechanism that might solve the academic
concern over judicial certainty does little good if it cannot be
employed in practice. This is where an option such as liquidating
the contractor's delay damages likely falls short, as owners would
have little reason to use such a system.'2 3 Finally, the proper
solution should provide the best balance of incentives for all parties
to avoid construction delay.

121. See supra Part IV.
122. See supra Part I.
123. See supra Part V.A.

1884

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1857

Given all of these competing concerns, the best solution includes
a combination of an elimination period coupled with a limitation on
the types of delay damages that are recoverable.' This system
would allow for a more balanced apportionment of the risk, which
should yield enhanced judicial certainty, as many of the policy
arguments against no damages for delay clauses disappear.'2 5 There
would also be a good balance of incentives for all parties to avoid
delays. Owners would not be entirely shielded from liability, while
contractors would still carry the risk associated with shorter delays
and consequential damages. All parties, therefore, would be
encouraged to cooperate in an attempt to avoid the common causes
of delay. The greatest potential drawback to this solution is the
practical question of whether owners would be inclined to adopt the
system in favor of the broader shield of a no damages for delay
clause. Careful analysis shows, however, that no damages for delay
clauses are not nearly as impenetrable as they sound. Owners may
be well-served to step back to this more compromising alternative,
where some of their liabilities may be higher, but where their
protection from open-ended claims is much more certain and judicial
enforcement more predictable.
CONCLUSION

The use of no damages for delay clauses to apportion delay risks
in construction contracts has proven deficient. The risk of delay has
an enormous economic impact on construction contracting, and the
calculation and proof of delay claims is extremely complicated. The
no damages for delay clause requires parties to perform the nearly
impossible task of placing a monetary value on that risk at the
inception of a project, all the while having little certainty as to
whether the clause will be enforced. In addition to these practical
difficulties, no damages for delay clauses simply lead to inequitable
results.
The construction industry is all about risk management. The use
of no damages for delay clauses developed from owners' desire to
control their liabilities, but their use has proven unpredictable in
124. See supra Parts V.C-D.
125. See supra Part II.
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practice. This Note proposes an alternative provision that would
establish an elimination period-a minimum duration of total delay
before damages are recoverable-coupled with a provision limiting
the contractor's delay damages to specified direct costs. This
alternative to the no damages for delay clause would provide better
certainty, practicality and incentives, and a more appropriate
balance of risk exposure for all parties.
Carl S. Beattie

